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TREADING WATER: HOW CITIZENS, STATES,
AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY CAN RESTORE PROPER CRIMINAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S
NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE
ELIMINATION SYSTEM
Marley Kimelman*
11 WASH. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 173 (2021)
ABSTRACT
Upon the passage of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) in 1972, primary
responsibility for protecting the United States' water quality and
preventing water pollution shifted from the states to the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”). The program at the heart of the Clean Water
Act, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”),
requires anyone who discharges pollutants into the waters of the United
States to abide by the terms of a permit issued under the program. If a
discharge occurs in violation of the permit or without a permit, and
prosecutors are able to prove the responsible party acted with ordinary
negligence, criminal charges can be brought under the statute. Forty*

Marley Kimelman is a third-year law student at The George Washington University
Law School, class of 2021, focused on environmental enforcement and protection.
Marley graduated from Northeastern University in 2017 with a B.S. in Environmental
Studies and International Affairs and a minor in Global Social Entrepreneurship.

173

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2021

3

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

seven states have been authorized by the EPA to run and enforce an
NPDES permit program within their own borders. Instead of adopting an
intent standard of ordinary negligence as the federal statute and
regulations require, many states have been authorized to run their
programs with “gross” or “criminal” negligence intent standards.
Litigation over Idaho’s recent program approval could force the EPA to
assume responsibility over all approved state programs that are out of
compliance with the CWA and the EPA’s regulations. This outcome
could overload the EPA and put the NPDES program in jeopardy of
complete failure. But, with a few regulatory changes, the EPA can
prevent further litigation, comply with its non-discretionary duties laid
out in the CWA, and ensure the proper level of criminal deterrence
needed to protect water quality.
INTRODUCTION
It was just past midnight on March 24, 1989. The captain of the
Exxon Valdez, Joseph Hazelwood, had been drinking and was away from
his controls. His ship propelled along the jagged coast of Alaska.1 The
pitch-black waves of the Prince William Sound pounded relentlessly on
the sides of the massive oil tanker. That morning, the Exxon Valdez,
carrying over fifty-three million gallons of crude oil, collided with Bligh
Reef about 1.5 miles off the coast of Tatitlek, Alaska, spilling its
contents into the Sound.2 Before the flow could be stopped, over ten
million gallons of crude oil contaminated one of the most ecologically
sensitive and remote locations in the United States.3 Countless mammals,
birds, and fish were killed or harmed, and thousands of people’s
livelihoods were destroyed.4
In 1997, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld misdemeanor charges
against Cpt. Hazelwood under Alaska state law.5 The eight-year criminal
court battle and Cpt. Hazelwood’s eventual conviction on criminal
charges turned on the court’s interpretation of a single word in the
statute: negligence.6 The question before the court was whether Cpt.
Hazelwood could be charged criminally for mere ordinary negligence,7
1
See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/exxon-valdez-oil-spill.
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
See id.
5
See Alaska Stat. Ann. § 46.03.790; State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 885 (Alaska
1997).
6
See Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 885.
7
Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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or was a form of heightened or “gross” negligence8 needed?9 Ultimately,
the Alaska Supreme court held that ordinary negligence was enough for
criminal charges.10
The criminal case against Cpt. Hazelwood was decided in State v.
Hazelwood.11 Cpt. Hazelwood was not prosecuted under the Clean Water
Act (CWA).12 Rather, it was the ordinary “negligence” intent standard, or
mens rea, in the Alaskan statute that gave the state prosecutors the ability
to bring criminal charges.13 Without this ordinary negligence mens rea,14
Cpt. Hazelwood’s actions would not have resulted in any type of
criminal penalty under the state statute. This same mens rea is found in
the CWA, giving federal prosecutors the ability to bring misdemeanor
criminal charges against negligent violators of the CWA.15 While state
prosecutors should have this same ability to prosecute criminally under
an ordinary negligence standard,16 many states have intentionally
stripped themselves of this power with the consent of the EPA,
undermining their ability to properly enforce criminal violations of the
CWA.
Because state environmental agencies and the EPA have differing
capacities, resources, and expertise, the CWA is designed to utilize both
in its effort to control water pollution. One of the most important aspects
of the CWA, and a clear example of cooperative federalism, is the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”).17 The
NPDES program requires dischargers of pollutants into jurisdictional
waters to obtain and comply with an NPDES permit outlining their

8

Gross Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
See Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 885.
10
See id.
11
See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, supra note 1.
12
See State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 885 (Alaska 1997).
13
See id.
14
See Mens Rea, Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mens_rea
(last visited Dec. 7, 2020). Mens rea refers to the state of mind statutorily required in
order to convict a particular defendant of a particular crime. Establishing the mens rea of
an offender is usually necessary to prove guilt in a criminal trial.
15
See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319
(2019).
16
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2) (“The burden of proof and degree of knowledge or intent
required under State law for establishing violations under paragraph (a)(3) of this section
shall be no greater than the burden of proof or degree of knowledge or intent EPA must
provide when it brings an action under the appropriate Act.”).
17
See Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1225 (11th
Cir. 2009) (hailing the NPDES program as the centerpiece of the Clean Water Act).
9
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respective pollution allowances before discharging.18 Violators can be
punished with civil penalties, criminal penalties, or both.19
In order to preserve the cooperative federalism goal, the CWA
allows a state to assume its respective NPDES program from the EPA,
including enforcement power.20 This transfer is not automatic though,
and is governed by regulations to ensure that states properly and
effectively maintain the same standards as the EPA.21 The EPA’s
regulations require that state criminal intent standards, or mens rea, be no
stricter than the federal standard.22 As previously mentioned, the CWA
contains an ordinary negligence criminal intent standard.23 A “stricter”
mens rea standard would require more egregious actions on the part of
the defendant in order to be charged and convicted under the applicable
statute.24
If a state would like to assume its own NPDES program, it must
submit an application to the EPA that lays out the proposed program.25
The proposed program must meet the mens rea requirements along with
eight additional listed criteria in CWA § 402(b)(1)-(9)26 and 40 C.F.R. §
123.27.27 The EPA has a non-discretionary duty to authorize that state to
run its own NPDES program if all criteria are met.28 The nine criteria are
meant to ensure state NPDES programs are adequate and will not
undermine water quality preservation and enforcement capabilities.29
In 1987, Congress strengthened the CWA by permitting
misdemeanor criminal prosecutions for a defendant who “negligently”
violates the statute and felony prosecutions for “knowingly” violating the
statute.30 This was a change from the unified and weaker “willfully or
18
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402 (this section includes industrial wastewater,
municipal wastewater, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), among
others).
19
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(b)-(c).
20
See id. § 402(b).
21
See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2).
22
See id.
23
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1).
24
See Mens Rea, supra note 14.
25
See 40 CFR § 123.21(a).
26
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)-(9).
27
See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2).
28
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b).
29
See RANDOLPH L. HILL, THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 74 (Mark A. Ryan, ed. 4th
ed. 2018).
30
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1)-(2) ((1) “Negligent Violations: 1 year
and/or $2,500 - 25,000 per day; Subsequent convictions 2 years and/or $50,000 per day.
(2) Knowing Violations: 3 years and/or $5,000 - 50,000 per day; Subsequent convictions
6 years and/or $100,000 per day”).
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negligently” criminal intent standard found in the original adoption of the
CWA.31 Case law that followed the 1987 amendments upheld
misdemeanor criminal penalties for “ordinary negligence,” not requiring
heightened “criminal” or “gross negligence.”32 Since 1972, forty-seven
states have been approved to take over NPDES authority from the EPA,33
Idaho being the most recent.34 Of these forty-seven states, thirty-three
require an intent standard for criminal enforcement that is stricter than
the CWA allows.35 Further, fourteen states that criminalize ordinary
negligence have not updated their programs to include the 1987 felony
amendment.36 In order to comply with the language and intent of the
CWA and its own regulations, while also ensuring sufficient deterrence,
avoiding future litigation, and preventing withdrawal of dozens of
authorized state NPDES programs, the EPA should promulgate new
CWA regulations.
These regulations should define “negligently,” outlined in the
CWA’s criminal penalties section, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), as ordinary
negligence, eliminate the note contained under 40 C.F.R. §
123.27(a)(3)(ii)37 to bring the regulation into compliance with the 1987
CWA amendments and prevent contradiction of the clear meaning of 40
31

See Brief for Appellant, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684 (9th Cir.
Oct. 2, 2018).
32
United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999).
33
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) State Program Authority,
ENV'T PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-programauthority (reporting that the only states not approved are Massachusetts, New Hampshire
and New Mexico).
34
See Brief for Appellant, supra note 31.
35
See e.g., Alabama, ALA. CODE § 22-22-14 (1975) (criminal penalties for willful or
gross negligence); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-609 (2020) (criminal penalties for
reckless, knowing, intentional, and criminal negligence violations); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 22a-438 (2013) (criminal penalties for criminal negligence and knowing
violations); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 403.161 (2020) (criminal penalties for willfulness,
reckless indifference, and gross careless disregard); and Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
38, § 349 (2019) (criminal penalties for intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with
criminal negligence violations).
36
See e.g., Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-263(B) (2018); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §
8-4-103 (1987); California, CAL. WATER CODE § 13387(b) (2011); Delaware, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 6013(a) (2008); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 342D-32(1) (2020); Iowa,
IOWA CODE § 39-117(1) (2020); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2076.2A (2000);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 115.071(2)(a) (2011); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-632
(2019); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10f(3) (2016); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT.
tit. 27A, § 2-6-206(G)(1)(2020); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.32(b) (2013); West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 22-11-24(c) (2009); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 283.91(3).
37
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii) (“States which provide the criminal remedies based on
‘criminal negligence,’ ‘gross negligence’ or strict liability satisfy the requirement of
paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section.”).
177
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C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2), and identify the states that have been authorized
to run their own NPDES programs with illegal heightened mens rea
standards for misdemeanor offenses. Further, the EPA should provide for
a period of two years from the issuance of the final rule for those states
to make the necessary legislative changes to their programs and resubmit them to the EPA for re-approval. Finally, the new regulations
should specify that if a state does not make the necessary changes in
time, the EPA has a non-discretionary duty to withdraw the prior
approval of that state’s NPDES authorization and take back program
authority under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3).
This Note will examine the CWA statutory and regulatory provisions
that establish the NPDES permit program requirements that a state must
meet in order to assume permitting and enforcement authority from the
EPA, specifically regarding criminal intent standards. It will expose a
multitude of issues arising from the failure of the EPA to update its
regulations to match CWA statutory changes, the EPA’s illegal approval
of multiple state NPDES permit programs, the consequences of these
approvals on state NPDES enforcement, and the impending crisis of the
NPDES program as a whole as it currently stands.
I.

LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The background sections that follow highlight the CWA, its purpose,
its structure, and its objectives. It features an in-depth look at the relevant
statutory provisions and accompanying EPA regulations that inform how
the CWA is to be carried out and enforced. Finally, it examines the
litigation arising from the EPA’s approval of Idaho’s NPDES permit
program and how this might affect the NPDES program as a whole.
A.

The Failure of State Water Pollution Control

By the mid-1960s, every state in the country had some type of public
agency responsible for monitoring and minimizing pollution to protect
water quality.38 Unfortunately, most state water pollution laws were
generally weak, and tough enforcement was essentially non-existent
against even the most blatant polluters.39 State agencies were reluctant to
take enforcement actions against polluting industries and individuals in
38
See N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How the
1972 Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Reform, 4
GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 80, 81-82 (2013).
39
See id.
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their own states, instead pursuing a strategy of voluntary compliance and
non-legal persuasion.40
In 1971, the Senate Committee on Public Works concluded that "the
national effort to abate and control water pollution has been inadequate
in every vital aspect."41 The report focused mostly on the lack of
enforcement, citing the fact that only one enforcement action under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act had been brought as of 1971.42
B.

The Federal Government Takes Action: The Environmental
Protection Agency and the Clean Water Act

On December 4, 1970, President Nixon created the EPA through
executive order.43 One of the EPA’s first major responsibilities would be
to clean up and protect the nation’s waters.44 Taking advantage of the
broad public support and momentum around environmental issues,
Congress decided to make sweeping amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948.45 These amendments became commonly
known as the Clean Water Act.46 Section 101(a) of the CWA specifically
states that the goal of the act is “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” and attain
“water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish and wildlife and provides for recreation.”47
The CWA gave the EPA broad jurisdiction to regulate discharges
into “navigable waters.”48 Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits the
40

See N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the
Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clear Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643, 643
(1977) (outlining state sanitary engineer’s attitude towards water quality and
enforcement: "Dilution is the solution to pollution.").
41
S. REP. No. 92-414, at 7 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 3668, 3674.
42
See id.
43
H.R. DOC. NO. 91-366, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATIVE TO REORGANIZATION PLANS NOS. 3 and 4 of 1970 (July 9, 1970).
44
See id.
45
See History of the Clean Water Act, EPA (2019), https://www.epa.gov/lawsregulations/history-clean-water-act (last visited Oct. 20, 2020); see generally Hines,
supra note 38. Congress overwhelmingly passed the amendments in the form of a bill on
October 4, 1972. President Nixon delayed for as long as he could before formally vetoing
it, citing too many federal dollars spent on the grant program. The next day, both
chambers of Congress easily overrode the President's veto. The amendments became law
on October 18, 1972.
46
See History of the Clean Water Act, supra note 45.
47
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 101(a).
48
Id. § 502(7) (defining navigable waters as “the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas”); see generally Donna M. Downing, Scope of “The Waters of the
United States” Protected by the Clean Water Act, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK
179
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“discharge of any pollutant” by any “person” from any “point source”
into “navigable waters,” except as in compliance with sections 302, 306,
307, 318, 402, and 404 of the Act.49 Section 402, NPDES, is the main
program that issues allowances in the form of permits to point source
discharges,50 and thus is at the heart of the Clean Water Act.
C.

The Structure of the Clean Water Act

1. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
To achieve the goals set out in section 301, the CWA sets liquid
waste (known as "effluent") limitations to constrain the amount of a
pollutant that any point source can legally discharge.51 To properly and
uniformly implement these effluent limitations, the CWA established the
NPDES permit program.52 The NPDES program requires all point source
discharges of pollutants into waters of the United States to obtain a
section 402 permit before discharging.53 The program covers a broad and
extensive list of point source dischargers.54 Overall, the NPDES program
ensures compliance with the CWA and the EPA’s requirements that
dischargers receive a permit.55 Individual NPDES permits include
effluent limitations and monitoring and reporting requirements, among
other standard conditions.56

13 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 4th ed. 2018) (“Whether a particular body of water is
jurisdictional as a ‘water of the United States’ is a key threshold question for determining
whether a discharge is into a water will require a permit under the CWA.”).
49
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 301(a); see also id. § 502(12) (defining
"discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source, and any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the
ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft."); id. § 502(14) (a
“point source” refers to "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance...from which
pollutants are or may be discharged").
50
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402.
51
See id. § 301; Kyle W. Robisch, Getting to the (Non)Point: Private Governance as a
Solution to Nonpoint Source Pollution, 67 VAND. L. REV. 539, 540, (2014).
52
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402.
53
See id.; Hines, supra note 38, at 81-82 (explaining that the NPDES permit program
resembles the Refuse Act of 1899’s prohibition of all industrial discharges to navigable
waters).
54
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 411 (cement manufacturing), §406 (grain mills), §412
(concentrated animal feeding operations).
55
See Karen M. McGaffey et al., Water Pollution Control Under the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 42 (Mark A. Ryan
ed., 4th ed. 2018).
56
See id. at 42-43.
180
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Technology-based effluent limitations are promulgated nationally by
the EPA and place limitations on the discharge of different types of
pollutants57 based solely on the availability and cost of pollution control
measures rather than on the impact the pollutants will have on the
receiving water.58 If the EPA has promulgated a guideline for an industry
to which a discharging facility belongs, the NPDES permit for that
discharger will incorporate those limits directly, with exceptions only in
extremely limited and defined circumstances.59 In addition to the
technology based standard, NPDES permit contains water-quality based
effluent limitations in order to maintain compliance with water quality
standards set by the EPA and the respective state where the facility is
located.60 These limitations are based solely on the impact of the
discharge on the receiving waters.61
Monitoring and reporting requirements are another important part of
a discharger’s NPDES permit. Permit holders are required to monitor
their own discharges and report the results to the proper permitting
authority in that state, either state or federal.62 These reports are called
discharge monitoring reports (DMRs).63 DMRs are one of the most
important tools used in enforcement actions against facilities that violate
their permits, in addition to random, periodic inspections of facilities
carried out by enforcement authorities.64
Anyone who discharges or proposes to discharge pollutants from a
point source to water of the United States must apply for and receive an
NPDES permit. If the terms of a permit are not complied with, or an
entity discharges pollutant without a proper permit, the CWA authorizes

57

See id.
See Industrial Effluent Guideline, EPA (Dec. 2019), https://www.epa.gov/eg/industrialeffluent-guidelines; CWA §§ 301, 306. These provisions establish four different types of
technology-based standards. They include: "best available technology economically
achievable," "best practicable control technology currently available,” "best conventional
pollutant control technology,” and "best available demonstrated control technology.”
Each of these standards are based on the performance of other facilities in the industry,
the type of pollutants discharged, and when the facility was constructed. They can be
based on the average of the best performing facilities, the single best operating facility, or
even the best demonstrated technology in a laboratory. A set of effluent guidelines for an
industry can include many or all of the different technology-based guidelines mentioned.
59
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 301(b), (n) (outlines the “fundamentally
different factor” variance for technology-based effluent guidelines).
60
McGaffey et al., supra note 55, at 51.
61
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 301(b)(1)(C), 302(a), 303(e)(3)(A).
62
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1)(4).
63
See id.
64
See McGaffey et al., supra note 55, at 43.
58

181

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2021

11

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

civil and criminal enforcement.65
2. Cooperative Federalism
While the history of the failure of state authority over water quality
was well-documented at the time of the CWA's passage, Congress
nevertheless preserved a vital role for states in the CWA.66 Section
402(b) of the CWA authorizes the EPA to delegate its inherent NPDES
permitting authority to a state for facilities discharging to waters within
that respective state.67 This delegation to states by the EPA is governed
meticulously by CWA provisions and EPA regulations. When a state
opts to seek NPDES permitting authority from the EPA, it must first
prepare and submit a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to the EPA
regional administrator.68 The proposed NPDES program “must contain
adequate authority for the states to issue permits, ensure the public and
any affected state receives notice for each application, provide an
opportunity for public comment and hearing on permit decisions, abate
permit violations, and provide for appropriate civil and criminal
penalties.”69 The EPA cannot approve a state program if it does not meet
the nine requirements set out in the statute,70 but has a non-discretionary
duty to approve the program if it does.71 One of those nine criteria is
“adequate authority” to “abate violations of the permit or permit
program, including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and
means of enforcement.”72
Even after being granted the NPDES permitting authority, states are
still subject to EPA oversight over most permitting decisions.73 In short,
the CWA and EPA regulations set “a solid federal floor for state program
integrity” before the EPA can relinquish its authority to issue permits and

65

See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309.
See 40 C.F.R. § 131.6; McGaffey et al., supra note 55, at 52. States are in charge of
setting the water quality standards for waters within their borders. This includes
designating use or uses for each body of water, the water quality criteria needed to protect
those uses, and an anti-degradation policy.
67
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b).
68
See 40 C.F.R. §123.21(a)(4).
69
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 401(b)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 123.25; HILL, supra
note 29, at 75.
70
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)-(9).
71
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b) (EPA “shall approve” a state’s
application “unless [EPA] determines that adequate authority does not exist”).
72
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 402(b)(7).
73
See 33 U.S.C. §1342(b); HILL, supra note 29, at 77. This power allows EPA to “veto” a
permit without stripping the state of its program entirely.
66
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enforce violations.74 As of the writing of this Note, forty-seven states
have been authorized to administer their own NPDES program, the
majority of which were approved within five years of 1972.75
While it may seem that the ability to delegate is unnecessary, the
burden of issuing NPDES permits is enormous and would be impractical
for the EPA to take on alone. The EPA’s own data shows that there are
currently more than 51,000 facilities in the United States with an active
or pending state issued NPDES permit or permit application in fortyseven states that have assumed their own permitting program from the
EPA.76 That number is roughly fifty times the number of facilities with
an EPA issued permit or pending permit.77 Since 2010, Congress has
decreased the EPA’s budget by $1.4 billion dollars, down to $8.8 billion,
and, since 1999, the number of EPA employees has declined by roughly
twenty-three percent.78 By contrast, California’s most recent budget
proposal included $11.3 billion for their state Natural Resource and
Environmental Protection agencies79 and New York allocated $1.8
billion for their Department of Environmental Conservation.80 With the
lack of funding and staff at the federal level compared to many states,
state control of local NPDES permitting and enforcement is essential.
But, while state power over their own programs has increasingly become
a necessity, the sufficiency and integrity of their programs have
increasingly come into question—especially in regard to criminal
enforcement.
3. Clean Water Act Criminal Enforcement

74

Hines, supra note 38, at 99.
See NPDES State Program Information, EPA (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-information. The “Authority” button on
this EPA webpage shows the year in which each of the forty-seven states was authorized
to administer the CWA.
76
ECHO, EPA, https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/facility-search/results. EPA’s Enforcement
and Compliance History Online (ECHO) tool can be used to search for the total number
NPDES permits issued in each state by all non-federal permitting authorities. These
include states, municipalities, and tribal agencies. The total number is 51,011 facilities.
77
See id.
78
See EPA’s Budget and Spending, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget
(last updated June 24, 2020).
79
See Gabriel Petrek, The 2019-20 Budget: Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection, LEG. ANALYST’S OFFICE (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3933.
80
See DIVISION OF THE BUDGET, NEW YORK STATE,
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy20/exec/agencies/appropData/Environmental
ConservationDepartmentof.html (last updated Jan. 1, 2019).
75
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Throughout the 1980s, Congress became increasingly committed to
stronger criminal enforcement for CWA violations.81 In 1982, the EPA
hired its first criminal investigators "in recognition that criminal penalties
had the potential for greater general deterrence than the more traditional
civil or administrative remedies."82 That same year, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) established an Environmental Crimes Unit to deal with the
increased prosecution load.83
From the passage of the CWA in 1972 until 1987, the EPA was
given the authority to bring only misdemeanor criminal charges against a
defendant who “willfully or negligently” violated enumerated sections of
the CWA, including the NPDES program.84 “Willfully or negligently”
was a conjunctive standard, allowing for some discretion in levying
criminal penalties against violators for differing levels of mens rea that
fell between negligence and willfulness.85 In 1987, Congress amended
the enforcement provisions of the statute in order to add a felony
provision and provide for harsher criminal penalties,86 but the EPA failed
to update the accompanying regulation to reflect those changes.87 The
statutory amendments divided the CWA criminal provision § 309(c)(1)
into two distinct subsections: a “negligent” misdemeanor,88 and a
81

See Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea and the Heightened Criminal Liability Imposed on
Violators of the Clean Water Act, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 377, 383 (1996).
82
Helen J. Brunner, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Retrospective View, 22
ENVTL. L 1315 (1992).
83
See Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division/historical-development-environmentalcriminal-law (last updated May 13, 2015).
84
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1) (1972) (“Any person who willfully
or negligently violates section 801, 302, 306, 307, or 308 of this Act, or any permit
condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under
section 402 of this Act by the Administrator or by a State, shall be punished by a fine of
not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for
not more than one year, or by both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a
first conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not
more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than two years,
or by both.”).
85
See Wettach, supra note 81, at 382.
86
See id. at 381.
87
See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii) (“Criminal fines shall be recoverable against any
person who willfully or negligently violates any applicable standards or limitations; any
NPDES permit condition; or any NPDES filing requirement. These fines shall be
assessable in at least the amount of $10,000 a day for each violation. Note: States which
provide the criminal remedies based on ‘criminal negligence,’ ‘gross negligence’ or strict
liability satisfy the requirement of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section.”).
88
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1) (“Any person who--(A) negligently
violates…any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a
permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator or by a State…shall be
184
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“knowing” felony.89 In effect, the amended § 309(c)(1) and new §
309(c)(2) give the EPA the authority to bring misdemeanor criminal
charges if they can establish that the defendant acted negligently, and
felony charges if a defendant acted knowingly.90 The amendments raised
the penalties for violations significantly,91 and only a few years after the
amendments went into effect, between 1992 and 1993, the number of
federal environmental criminal cases doubled.92 While the statutory
meaning of the “knowingly” standard has been the subject of some
dispute, litigation over the federal “negligently” standard, and
specifically what level of negligence states must adopt when they are
authorized to administer their own NPDES programs, has raised serious
questions about criminal enforcement of the CWA. This has put the
entire NPDES program at risk.
D.

Ordinary vs. Criminal Negligence

While § 309(c)(1) of the CWA does not specifically define the word
“negligently,” either in its original form or after the 1987 amendments,93
there is definitive and mounting case law that speaks to what type of
negligence applies. As of the writing of this Note, three United States
punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or
by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or by both. If a conviction of a person is for a
violation committed after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph,
punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by
imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or by both.”).
89
Id. § 309(c)(2) (“Any person who--(A) knowingly violates…any permit condition or
limitation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this
title by the Administrator or by a State…shall be punished by a fine of not less than
$5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than
3 years, or by both. If a conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a first
conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more
than $100,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than 6 years, or by
both.”).
90
See Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1)-(2).
91
See James D. Oesterle, Enforcement: Sections 309 and 505, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT
HANDBOOK 310 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 4th ed. 2018); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §
309(c)(2) (Those who “knowingly” discharge a pollutant from a point source into a water
of the United States without an NPDES Permit or in violation of a permit “shall be
punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or
by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both. If a conviction of a person is for a
violation committed after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph,
punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $100,000 per day of violation, or by
imprisonment of not more than 6 years, or by both.”).
92
See Wettach, supra note 81, at 383.
93
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1).
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Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the common law “ordinary” or
“simple” negligence standard applies to § 309(c)(1) and not a heightened
“gross” or “criminal” negligence standard.94 While the debate about
which form of negligence is required by § 309(c)(1) continues in
academic circles,95 neither the courts nor the EPA have shown any
appetite for reconsidering their interpretations of the standard.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines negligence as “[t]he failure to
exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would
have exercised in a similar situation.96 Gross negligence is defined as
“[a] lack of even slight diligence or care…[a] conscious, voluntary act or
omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty and of the consequences to
another party, who may typically recover exemplary damages.”97 The
difference between the lower ordinary negligence standard and the
higher criminal negligence standard can be significant and lies "in their
descriptions of the relevant unobserved risk."98
This distinction between levels of negligence is critically important
because when a state assumes NPDES authority, they are also assuming
the criminal enforcement authority from the EPA. The EPA’s regulations
plainly require that state criminal intent standards be “no greater” than
federal standards.99 Because the EPA and the courts have established that
§309(c)(1) refers to “ordinary” negligence and not some heightened
“gross” or “criminal” negligence,100 it follows that state criminal intent
standards can be no higher than “ordinary” negligence. While the
regulations are clear, thirty-three states have NPDES programs with
94
See e.g., United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120-22 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1102, 1121 (2000) (explaining that if Congress intended to prescribe a
heightened negligence standard, it could have done so explicitly as it did elsewhere in the
statute); United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1279 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating “the Clean
Water Act...criminalizes any act of ordinary negligence that leads to the discharge of a
pollutant into the navigable waters of the United States.”); United States v. Pruett, 681
F.3d 232, 243 (5th Cir. 2012) (“This subsection [CWA § 309(c)(1)(a)] imposes an
ordinary negligence standard.”).
95
See David E. Roth, Stephen R. Spivack, Joseph G. Block, The Criminalization of
Negligence Under the Clean Water Act, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 4, 9 (advocating for
either Congress or the Supreme Court to intervene and make clear that mere civil
negligence should not be punished as criminal conduct under the CWA).
96
Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
97
Gross Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
98
See Common Issues, 2 STATE ENVTL. L. § 16:56 (2019); State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d
875, 885 (Alaska 1997).
99
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2) (“The burden of proof and degree of knowledge or intent
required under State law for establishing violations under paragraph (a)(3) of this section
shall be no greater than the burden of proof or degree of knowledge or intent EPA must
provide when it brings an action under the appropriate Act.”).
100
Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1120-22.
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heightened intent standards, in clear violation of the CWA and the EPA’s
regulations.101 This issue was recently in front of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, stemming from a challenge to the EPA’s 2018 approval of
Idaho’s NPDES program application.102
E.

Idaho Conservation League v. EPA: Challenging Idaho’s
NPDES Program and the Ninth Circuit’s Opinion

In 2018, Idaho became the forty-seventh, and latest, state to have its
own NPDES program authorized by the EPA – the Idaho Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (IPDES). The IDPES criminal penalty
provision does directly cover “negligent” misdemeanors,103 but the
state’s criminal code states that “[i]n every crime or public offense there
must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal
negligence.”104 In other words, Idaho’s IDPES enforcement law requires
a heightened or “gross” negligence standard for criminal prosecutions.
Neither Idaho nor the EPA disputed that contention.105 While the EPA
and Idaho were both in support of the IPDES program authorization, this
was not always the case.
Idaho first applied for authorization in August of 2016 but was
denied for the exact reason stated above. In a response letter to the Idaho
Department of Environmental Quality, the EPA stated:
The Clean Water Act (CWA) criminal intent standard
for negligence is simple negligence. As described in the
submitted Attorney General’s Statement, the State of
Idaho’s criminal intent standard for negligent violations
is gross negligence. 40 CFR 123.27(b)(2) requires states
101

See e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-22-14 (1975) (criminal penalties for willful or gross
negligence); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-609 (2017) (criminal penalties for reckless,
knowing, intentional, and criminal negligence violations); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-438
(2013) (criminal penalties for criminal negligence and knowing violations); FLA. STAT. §
403.161 (2019) (criminal penalties for willfulness, reckless indifference, and gross
careless disregard); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 349 (2019) (criminal penalties for
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence violations); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 750-2.4(b) (2019) (criminal penalties for criminal negligence).
102
See generally Brief for Appellant, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684
(9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2018).
103
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-117 (2020) (“Any person who willfully or negligently
violates any Idaho national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) standard or
limitation, permit condition or filing requirement shall be guilty of a misdemeanor…”).
104
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-114 (2020) (emphasis added).
105
See Response Brief for Appellee at 8-9, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 1872684 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2018).
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to have criminal intent standards that may not be greater
than the standards which apply to the EPA. Since the
CWA and federal courts have defined the CWA’s
negligence standard as ordinary or simply negligence, an
approvable State NPDES program must have a criminal
negligence standard that does not require a greater
burden of proof than this intent standard. A gross
negligence standard does not meet this requirement. As
such, Idaho will need to adequately address this criminal
negligence standard issue in order for EPA to approve
the IPDES program.106
In the letter, the EPA correctly identified that Idaho’s proposed
criminal intent standard, gross negligence, was greater than the CWA’s
ordinary negligence standard in section 309(c)(1), and thus not in
compliance with 40 CFR 123.27(b)(2).107 The EPA clearly
communicated to Idaho that until this situation was addressed, it could
not approve the IDPES program.108 On June 5, 2018, the EPA, under a
new presidential administration and EPA Administrator, approved the
IPDES program despite Idaho’s refusal to make any changes to its
“gross” negligence standard.109 Idaho Conservation League (ICL)
brought suit against the EPA for their approval of the IPDES program,
citing the exact criminal mens rea issue outlined by the EPA itself.110
In response, the brief filed by the EPA in Idaho Conservation
League v. EPA (ICL v. EPA) put forth a two-part main argument to
counter the claim that the IPDES program contains insufficient criminal
enforcement authority. First, the EPA argued that the note contained in
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii), that says “[s]tates which provide the
criminal remedies based on ‘criminal negligence,’ ‘gross negligence’ or
strict liability satisfy the requirement of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this
section”, would “control the more general language in 40 C.F.R. §
123.27(b)(2).”111 Second, the EPA argued that the “cross-referenced
106
See Letter from Dennis J. McLearran, Regional Administrator, EPA, to John Trippets,
Director, IDAHO DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-08/documents/ipdes-correspondencecompleteness-finding-09302016.pdf.
107
See id.
108
See id.
109
Brief for Appellant at 38, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684 (9th Cir.
Oct. 2, 2018).
110
See id. at 1.
111
See Response Brief for Appellee at 16, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 1872684 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2018); 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2) (“The burden of proof and degree
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language in the two regulatory provisions, 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3) and
(b)(2), creates ambiguity” and that the agency’s interpretation of a
regulation that “points in more than one direction” is entitled to
deference under Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414-2418 (2019),
Supreme Court precedent reinforcing that courts should defer to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations if they are genuinely
ambiguous.112
ICL asked the court to remand the case without vacatur of the entire
IPDES program.113 As mentioned previously, the importance of state
delegated NPDES programs is undeniable, and ICL’s remedy sought
would preserve the IPDES program as a whole, but require Idaho to fix
the criminal intent standards in the program and then re-submit for
approval within two years.114 Idaho would have to pass amendments to
the IPDES program or their criminal code through their state legislature
before resubmitting.115
II.

ANALYSIS

On September 10, 2020, in an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit
dismissed both of the EPA’s arguments, holding that the Idaho state plan
must employ a standard “’no greater than’ simple negligence.”116
According to the court, the EPA’s assertion that the agency may approve
states’ NPDES program applications that employ “gross” or “criminal”
negligence mens rea standards stands against both the plain reading of its

of knowledge or intent required under State law for establishing violations under
paragraph (a)(3) of this section, shall be no greater than the burden of proof or degree of
knowledge or intent EPA must provide when it brings an action under the appropriate
Act.”).
112
See Response Brief for Appellee at 30, 34-35, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No.
18-72684 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2018) (citing Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414-2418
(2019)) (“To garner deference, the agency’s interpretation must be: (1) “reasonable” and
of “the character and context” to support deference based on whether the interpretation is
the agency’s official position; (2) within the agency’s substantive expertise; and (3)
reflective of the agency’s “fair and considered judgement” while taking into account
reliance interests and avoiding “unfair surprise to the regulated parties.” If an agency’s
interpretation is entitled to deference, then the applied deference “gives an agency
significant leeway to say what its own rules mean.”).
113
See Brief for Appellant at 38, Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684 (9th
Cir. Oct. 2, 2018).
114
See id.
115
See id.
116
See Idaho Conservation League v. EPA, No. 18-72684, 2020 WL 5422448, at *1 (9th
Cir. Sept. 10, 2020) (“Under § 123.27(b)(2), a state plan must employ a standard “no
greater than” simple negligence, such as strict liability or simple negligence.”).
189
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own regulations and the wording of the statute itself.117 As a remedy, the
court granted ICL’s request, and remanded without vacatur for the EPA
to promptly address the deficiency with respect to the mens rea
standard.118
While the opinion is unpublished, and intended only for precedent in
the Ninth Circuit, the opinion is the first and only time a United States
Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled on the state mens rea issue. Future
appellants will undoubtedly rely on and cite to ICL v. EPA and other
jurisdictions will undoubtedly seek guidance from the opinion. The
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling beyond Idaho are substantial
and raise a host of unanswered questions and problems for the EPA.
Could other state NPDES programs be subject to litigation by citizens
groups similar to ICL if they have similar issues with the criminal intent
standards? What statutory power or obligations does the EPA have to
remedy these programs, and how should they go about exercising that
power? What is the best solution in order to preserve the integrity of the
NPDES program? These are all questions that need to be answered in
light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
A.

Federal Legal Requirements for Corrective Action

In 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3), the CWA provides that, where the EPA
determines that a state is not administering its program in a manner that
conforms to the Act, the EPA must inform the state, request corrective
action, and proceed with withdrawing approval of the state program if
corrective action is not taken within ninety days of the EPA’s request.119
“Whenever the Administrator determines . . . that a State is not
administering a program . . . in accordance with requirements of this
section, [they] shall so notify the State and, if appropriate corrective
action is not taken . . . the Administrator shall withdraw approval of such
program.”120 There is case law to suggest that § 1342(c)(3) places a nondiscretionary duty upon the Administrator of the EPA to withdraw a state
program that does not take the corrective action required.121 When the
EPA learns that state practices do not conform to federal law, it has an
117

See id.
See id.
119
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3).
120
Id. (emphasis added).
121
See generally, Askins v. Ohio Dep't of Agric., 809 F.3d 868, 870 (6th Cir. 2016)
(“[W]hen a state fails to administer properly a state-NPDES program, the CWA requires
the EPA to withdraw approval of the state-NPDES program after a hearing, notice, and
time to cure…”).
118
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obligation to make findings and demand corrective action.122 Courts have
also found that the EPA has a non-discretionary duty to act, enforceable
under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2), the CWA’s citizen suit provision.123 In
order to alert the Administrator to deficiencies in a state program,
citizens may file withdrawal petitions with the EPA.124
III.
A.

SOLUTION

How the EPA Should Address Inadequate State NPDES
Programs

Now that the Ninth Circuit has ruled on the Idaho Program, the EPA
has a non-discretionary duty to demand that the thirty-three states with
inadequate programs take corrective action to address their mens rea
standards.125 The EPA will most likely receive withdrawal petitions from
citizens’ groups, identifying the mens rea issue in their respective states,
and demanding that the EPA remedy the program in cooperation with the
state, or terminate the program. In reality though, with the EPA’s relative
lack of resources, the prospect of the termination of dozens of states’
authorizations and the subsequent assumption by the EPA would create
serious problems for the efficacy and efficiency of the NPDES program.
Further, withdrawal petitions filed as far back as 1997 are still officially
pending with the EPA, showing that the withdrawal process is painfully
slow and mostly ineffective at addressing major issues with state
plans.126 Because both the EPA and states know that the agency does not
have the practical ability to take back state NPDES programs, the EPA
has very little motivation or leverage to engage meaningfully with states.
While voluntary state action is extraordinarily unlikely, especially in
states that do not prioritize environmental protection, the new political
climate in Washington provides a rare opportunity for EPA to take action
on this issue. Under the out-going Trump Administration, the EPA
approved Idaho’s inadequate program after previously denying the same
program during the Obama Administration. But, with a new
Administration and a Congress more inclined to put pressure on the EPA
122

Save the Valley, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 99 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985 (S.D. Ind.
2000).
123
Save the Valley, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Save the Valley II), 223 F. Supp. 2d
997, 1007 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
124
NPDES State Program Withdrawal Petitions, EPA (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-withdrawal-petitions.
125
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3).
126
NPDES State Program Withdrawal Petitions, EPA (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-withdrawal-petitions.
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to protect the environment and restore a functioning Clean Water Act,
the actions suggested below can and should be pursued immediately.
In order to remedy the state program situation without endangering
the NPDES program and water quality, the EPA should promulgate new
CWA regulations. These regulations should first, define “negligently,”
outlined in the CWA’s criminal penalties section 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1),
as ordinary negligence in order to prevent any further litigation under the
NPDES program or other CWA permitting programs, such as section
404 discharge of dredged or fill material. The regulations will also serve
to reduce confusion among states and regulated entities. Additionally, the
EPA should eliminate the outdated note contained under 40 C.F.R. §
123.27(a)(3)(ii)127 bringing the regulation into compliance with the 1987
CWA amendments and preventing the contradiction of the clear meaning
of 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2). Further, the EPA should identify the states
that have been authorized to run their own NPDES programs with illegal
heightened mens rea standards for misdemeanor offenses, and provide
for a period of two years from the issuance of the final rule for those
states to make the necessary legislative changes to their programs and resubmit them to the EPA for re-approval. Finally, the new regulations
should specify that if a state does not make the necessary changes in
time, the EPA has a non-discretionary duty to withdraw the prior
approval of that state’s NPDES authorization and take back program
authority under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3).
1. The EPA’s non-discretionary duties under 33 U.S.C. §
1342(c)(3)
The proper outcome of ICL v. EPA will force the EPA to identify
and provide notice to the thirty-three states with non-compliant NPDES
programs under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). If the EPA fails to perform the
non-discretionary duties outlined in § 1342(c)(3), the agency will avail
itself to suits filed pursuant to the CWA’s citizen suit provision, 33
U.S.C.A. § 1365(a)(2), which states that “any citizen may commence a
civil action on his own behalf—(2) against the Administrator where there
is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under
this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.”128 The
only way to avoid these inevitable citizen suits from arising across the
country, is to send notice to all states that have NPDES programs not in
127
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii) (“States which provide the criminal remedies based on
‘criminal negligence,’ ‘gross negligence’ or strict liability satisfy the requirement of
paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section.”).
128
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2).

192

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol11/iss2/3

22

Kimelman: Treading Water: How Citizens, States, and the Environmental Prote
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

compliance with CWA § 309(c)(1)’s ordinary negligence requirement,129
and demand corrective action. The most efficient way to accomplish this
is by adopting new and revised CWA regulations.
2. Adopting new CWA regulations
The EPA should first, define “negligently,” in the CWA’s criminal
penalties section CWA § 309(c)(1),130 as ordinary negligence in order to
prevent any further litigation and reduce confusion among states and
regulated entities. Second, the EPA should eliminate the note contained
under 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii),131 remove the outdated “willfully or
negligently” language in (a)(3)(ii),132 and replace it with the current
CWA disjunctive “negligently”133 or “knowingly”134 mens rea standards.
These changes would bring the regulation into compliance with the 1987
CWA amendments, and prevent the contradiction of the clear meaning of
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(b)(2), which prevents the states from having stricter
mens rea standards than the EPA.135 Further, the EPA will prevent
litigation in likely all thirty-three of the non-compliant states, and future
litigation over approval of states’ section 404 state programs.136
Additionally, while § 1342 (c)(3) serves as a mandate on the EPA to take
back programs if the changes have not been made in ninety days,137
states will need more than roughly three months to make the legislative
changes required to keep their programs. Giving states two years to
amend their programs will allow for state legislatures to make the
necessary statutory changes. The threat of losing permitting authority
over their own industries to the federal government should incentivize
many states to take the corrective action needed quickly. Finally, the new
regulations should specify that if a state does not make the necessary
changes in time, the EPA has a non-discretionary duty to withdraw the
prior approval of that state’s NPDES authorization and take back
program authority under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). This addition should
ensure that states comply with the new regulations or face removal of
129

Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 309(c)(1).
Id.
131
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their programs.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to protecting the safety and quality of water, the
United States has an undoubtedly long and complex history. From the
turn of the twentieth century all the way until 1972, the United States’
water pollution control policies focused on giving states broad and
supreme power to both set water quality standards and enforce violations
as they saw fit. The results of those policies were devastating and led to
the passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972, giving the federal
government the chief authority to set water quality standards and enforce
violations, with the ability to delegate some of this power to states. This
balance of power between the EPA and the states is vital to the success
of the CWA and specifically the NPDES program. Almost fifty years
after passage of the CWA, states and the EPA have strayed dangerously
far from its statutory requirements.
With thirty-three states demanding a heightened negligence standard
in order to bring misdemeanor charges for violations of their NPDES
programs, and a recent Ninth Circuit ruling that unequivocally calls for
state programs to employ ordinary negligence mens rea, the NPDES
program as currently instituted is in jeopardy of failing. In order to
preserve the program, increase its efficacy, and comply with statutory
requirements, the EPA should promulgate new CWA regulations,
remove the outdated note in 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(ii), notify the states
that’s are not in compliance, and prepare to remove state authorizations if
necessary.
Overall, the fate of the NPDES program is in doubt. But, with a few
pointed regulatory changes, the EPA can prevent further litigation,
comply with its non-discretionary duties laid out in the CWA, and ensure
the proper level of criminal deterrence needed to protect water quality.
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